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I.

INTRODUCTION

Many practitioners and scholars view qualified immunity as the most important doctrine in the law of constitutional torts because it shields a government
official from a civil suit for monetary damages under federal civil rights laws
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unless the official violates "clearly established" constitutional rights.' The doctrine
protects a public official who has purportedly violated the Constitution from
individual liability, unless the official had fair notice that his alleged conduct
2
would violate "the Supreme Law of the Land." "Qualified or 'good faith'
immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official."I
Much of the power of the qualified immunity doctrine arises from the fact that a
defendant must simply raise it as a defense, and the plaintiffs have the burden of
4
establishing the proof and arguments necessary to overcome it.
Under "the traditional two-part qualified immunity framework," a court
considers "first the existence of a constitutional violation and next whether the
law as to that violation was clearly established."' By 2007, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted a "sliding scale" method to determine
when law is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, such that
"[t]he more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional
principles, the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish
the violation." 6 For nearly a decade, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit employed this unique method for determining whether a plaintiff
7
can show that a constitutional right was clearly established. However, based

' See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 (1976); John C. Jeffries, Jr., What's Wrong with
Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. Rav. 851, 851-52 (2010); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 814 (1982) (noting qualified immunity's importance "to society as a whole").
2 Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1326 (11th Cit. 2019) (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. VI),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2678 (2019).
3 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815 (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).

Strickland v. City of Crenshaw, 114 F. Supp. 3d 400, 412 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (citing Pierce
v. Smith, 117 F3d 866, 871-72 (5th Cit. 1997) ("[N]oting that the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that an individual defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.")).
Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 E3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cit. 2009) (citing Weigel v. Broad, 544
4

E3d 1143, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008)).
6 Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cit. 2007) (quoting Pierce v.
Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cit. 2004)).
' See, e.g., Sanchez v. Hartley, 810 F3d 750, 759-60 (10th Cir. 2016); Ornelas v. Lovewell,
613 E App'x 718, 721-22 (10th Cit. 2015); Waters v. Coleman, 632 E App'x 431, 435 (10th
Cit. 2015); Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 E3d 405, 427 (10th Cir. 2014); Fogarty v. Gallegos,
523 F3d 1147, 1161 (10th Cit. 2008). One commentator has suggested that "several circuits use
a 'sliding scale"' approach to qualified immunity-however, the commentator cited only Tenth
Circuit opinions in support of this assertion. See Derek Warden, A Helping Hand: Examining the
Relationship Between (1) Title II of the ADA'S Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity Cases and (2) the
Doctrine ofQualfied Immunity in $1983 andBivens Cases to Expandand Strengthen Sources of"Clearly
Established"Law in Civil Rights Actions, 29 GEO. MASON U. Cv. RTs. L.J. 43, 59 n.86 (2018)
(emphasis added) (citing Casey, 509 F.3d at 1284; Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1279). From approximately
2007 to 2016, the Tenth Circuit was the only circuit to employ the "sliding scale" approach to
clearly established law-the Tenth Circuit's various cases employing this method are discussed infra.
But see Guertin v. Michigan, 924 E3d 309, 314 (6th Cit. 2019) (Sutton, J., concurring in the denial
of rehearing en banc) (suggesting that, "in the context of a clearly established conscience-shocking
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upon more recent qualified immunity decisions handed down by the United
States Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit has seemingly retreated from its sliding
scale approach.! However, a handful of district courts within the Tenth Circuit
continue to apply the sliding scale analysis to the question of whether clearly
established law exists in a given case.'
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the qualified immunity
defense.'o Part III explores the origins of the Tenth Circuit's sliding scale
approach to analyzing the defense." Part IV addresses the Supreme Court's
strengthening of the qualified immunity defense, particularly in the last ten
years.' 2 Parts V and VI discuss the Supreme Court's decisions in Aldaba v. Pickens
and White v. Pauly-in each of these cases, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit, leading courts within the circuit to question the sliding scale approach as
discussed in Part VII of this Article. 3 Finally, Part VIII of this Article argues that
the Tenth Circuit should abolish or replace the sliding scale, as the Tenth Circuit's
novel approach to qualified immunity conflicts with United States Supreme
Court precedent, particularly the more recent qualified immunity opinions from
the High Court." As discussed in Part VIII, to the extent that it has not already

standard of care," for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, "the case law seems to present a
sliding scale-the more evidence of unforgiveable intent, the less necessity to identify a case just like
this one.").
' See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.
Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam); Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); Nosewicz v. Janosko, 754
E App'x 725, 733 n.8 (10th Cit. 2018); Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1211 n.10 (10th Cit.
2017) ("[Our sliding-scale approach may arguably conflict with recent Supreme Court precedent
on qualified immunity. The possibility of a conflict arises because the sliding-scale approach may
allow us to find a clearly established right even when a precedent is neither on point nor obviously
applicable." (citations omitted)), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 5 (2018); Aldaba v. Pickens, 844 E3d 870,
877 (10th Cit. 2016).
9 See, e.g., Youngblood v. Qualls, 308 E Supp. 3d 1184, 1201 (D. Kan. 2018) (citations
omitted); Hayenga v. Garth, No. 18-cv-02038-KLM, 2019 WL 2471086, at *7 (D. Colo. June
13, 2019); Jager v. Mulheron, No. 18-743 GBW/CG, 2018 WL 6436913, at *6 (D.N.M. Dec. 7,
2018); Boateng v. Metz, No. 18-cv-2694-WJM-SKC, 2019 WL 4751748, at *3 (D. Colo. Sep. 30,
2019); see also Myers v. Brewer, No. 17-2682, 2018 WL 3145401, at *8 (D. Kan. June 27, 2018)
(the "sliding scale test has been called into question recently ... but the Tenth Circuit has not yet
decided that it conflicts with Supreme Court authority." (citing McCoy v. Meyers, 887 E3d 1034,
1053 n.22 (10th Cit. 2018)), af'd, 773 E App'x 1032 (10th Cit. 2019); Arnold v. City ofOlathe,
Kansas, No. 18-2703-CM-JPO, 2019 WL 4305132, at *10 (D. Kan. Sep. 11, 2019).
See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 50-105 and accompanying text.
13

14

See infra notes 106-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 165 -70 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Quintana v. Santa Fe County

Bd. of Comm'rs, No. CIV 18-0043 JB/LF, 2019 WL 452755, at *37 (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2019);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Hartley v. Sanchez, 137 S. Ct. 1372 (Apr. 8, 2016) (No.
15-1281), 2016 WL 1554724, at *14 n.10.
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done so, the Tenth Circuit should formally do away with the sliding scale in its
qualified immunity jurisprudence."
II. A (BRIEF) SUMMARY

OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The defense of qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law."'" Qualified immunity shields government officials and employees "from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."" This doctrine balances "the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when
they perform their duties reasonably."" Qualified immunity provides government officials and employees the "breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments."' 9
Qualified immunity protects federal and state officials from liability for
discretionary functions, and from the "unwarranted demands customarily imposed
upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit." 2 0 The qualified immunity
privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability;
and . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial"

rather than disposing of it by way of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment. 2 1 In simple terms, qualified immunity allows public employees to do
22
their jobs without the persistent threat of lawsuits.
"When a defendant asserts qualified immunity .. . the burden shifts to the
plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles."2 3 The plaintiff must show both that a
defendant's actions "violated a constitutional or statutory right" and that the
right the defendant allegedly violated was "clearly established at the time of the

See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
16 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
" Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
15

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 5 (2013) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 743 (2011)).
1"

19

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526 (1985)), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see alo Peterson v. Jensen, 371
E3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Although summary judgment provides the typical vehicle for
asserting a qualified immunity defense, we will also review this defense on a motion to dismiss."
(citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526)).
22 See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lewis v. Tripp, 604 E3d
20
21

1221, 1230 (10th Cir. 2010)).
23 Riggins v. Goodman, 572 E3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009).
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conduct at issue."2 4 To meet this heavy burden, the plaintiff must "do more than
simply allege the violation of a general legal precept."2 5 Rather, the plaintiff is
required to demonstrate: (1) a substantial correspondence between the conduct
in question; and (2) prior case law establishing that the defendant's actions were
clearly prohibited.2 6
For decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned the lower courts not
to analyze clearly established law at too high a level of generality. 27 In all Section
1983 cases, courts must undertake the qualified immunity analysis "in light of
the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." 28 That said,
the Supreme Court must often "slosh [its] way through the fact-bound morass
of reasonableness" to resolve a qualified immunity case. 2 9 The Supreme Court
has not shied away from reviewing-and reversing-fact-intensive qualified
immunity cases, particularly where the lower courts have egregiously misapplied
settled law. o

III.

THE ORIGIN OF THE SLIDING SCALE IN THE
TENTH CIRCUIT: CASEYAND PIERCE

The first Tenth Circuit case to identify the court's approach to analyzing
clearly established law as utilizing a sliding scale was the court's 2007 decision
in Casey v. City ofFederalHeights."' In Casey, the Tenth Circuit reversed a district
court's grant of qualified immunity where officers accosted a man on his way
back to a courthouse.3 2 Plaintiff Casey was under investigation for a misdemeanor

24 Nelson v. McMullen,
207 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
25 Jantz v. Muci, 976 E2d 623, 627 (10th Cit.
1992).
26 See id.; see also Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1184 (10th
Cir. 2010).
27 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615-16 (1999); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S.
635, 639 (1987) ("[Wlhether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally
liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness'
of the action . . . assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was
taken." (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982))).
28 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also
Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cit. 1993) ("To show [that a right] is
clearly established, a plaintiff cannot rely on general, conclusory allegations or broad legal truisms."
(quotations and citations omitted)).
29 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (internal quotations omitted).

30 See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Cr. 305 (2015) (per curiam); Stanton v. Sims, 571
U.S. 3 (2013); Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469 (2012) (per curiam); see also City of San Francisco v.
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775-76 (2015); Plumhoffv. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014); Reichle v.
Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012).
31

Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007).

32 Id. at 1287.
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and, while walking towards the courthouse in a non-violent, non-hostile manner,
officers confronted Casey.33 The Tenth Circuit examined the excessiveness of the
force used against Casey and considered "first whether each officer's conduct
violated the Constitution; then, if so, whether it also violated clearly established
law." 3 4 In analyzing whether the defendant officers violated Casey's clearly
established Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable seizure, the court
noted that, "'[olrdinarily,' . . . for a rule to be clearly established 'there must be

a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains."'"3 The Tenth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Hope
v. Pelzer, in which the Court posited that "officials can still be on notice that their
conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." 3 6 In Hope,
the Supreme Court suggested that the "salient question" in qualified immunity
cases is whether the state of the law at the time of the challenged conduct gave
defendants fair warning that their actions were unconstitutional. 7 Consequently,
the Tenth Circuit formulated the "relevant inquiry" as being "whether the law
put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was unconstitutional."" In
Casey, the Tenth Circuit pronounced-for the first time, but without significant
explanation-that the court had "adopted a sliding scale to determine when law
is clearly established.""
The Tenth Circuit's 2004 decision in Pierce v. Gilchrist, cited by the Tenth
Circuit in Casey, was an important precursor case that supplied language
for the court's adoption of the sliding scale. In Pierce, the plaintiff brought a
3 Id. at 1281-82. Eyewitnesses confirmed the plaintiff was non-violent, and rather than
resisting arrest, the plaintiff was merely walking toward the courthouse. Id
3

See id. at 1282.

3 Id. at 1284 (quoting Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 E2d 1493, 1498 (10th
Cir. 1992)).

36 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). In Hope, prison guards handcuffed the plaintiff,
a prison inmate, to a "hitching post" on two separate occasions. Hope, 536 U.S. at 733-74.
During the second such instance, the prison guards made Hope take off his shirt; he remained
shirtless all day while the sun burned his skin. Id. at 734-35. Hope remained attached to the
post for approximately seven hours, during which "he was given water only once or twice and
was given no bathroom breaks." Id at 735. The Supreme Court found that Hope had alleged an
"obvious" Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 738. Citing its prior opinion in United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), the Court found that government "officials can still be on notice
that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." Hope, 536 U.S.
at 754. The Court ultimately concluded that the defendants violated clearly established law:
"[t]he obvious cruelty inherent in [the hitching post] practice should have provided respondents
with some notice that their alleged conduct violated Hope's constitutional protection against cruel
and unusual punishment." Id. at 744-45.
3 Id.
38 Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cit. 2007) (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
39 Id.; see also Smith v. City & County of Denver, No. 07-cv-00 1 54-WDM-BNB, 2008 WL
724629, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2008).
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malicious prosecution claim based upon the allegation that a forensic chemist
fabricated inculpatory evidence and disregarded exculpatory evidence, causing the
plaintiff to suffer imprisonment for fifteen years for a rape he did not commit.40
In determining the chemist violated the plaintiff's clearly established Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and
a deprivation of liberty, respectively, the Tenth Circuit looked to its pre-Hope
cases and found that "qualified immunity will not be granted if government
defendants fail to make 'reasonable applications of the prevailing law to their own
circumstances."' Without saying as much explicitly, the Tenth Circuit essentially
defined the sliding scale by opining that "r[t]he degree of specificity required from
prior case law depends in part on the character of the challenged conduct," where
"[t]he more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional
principles, the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish
the violation." 42 Three years later, the Tenth Circuit relied on the "obviously
egregious" language from Pierce in announcing the adoption of the sliding scale
in qualified immunity cases.4 3
Four months after the Tenth Circuit decided Casey, the court applied its
sliding scale approach in Fogarty v. Gallegos.' In Fogarty, the plaintiff claimed
the defendants' use of pepper balls and tear gas against him, combined with the
use of force to tear plaintiff's tendon, constituted excessive force. Applying
the sliding scale, the Tenth Circuit noted that, while its prior opinions had not
directly addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of "less lethal" munitions,
a reasonable officer would have been on notice that the use of pepper balls and
tear gas could constitute excessive force. 6 The court likewise concluded "that it
would be apparent to a reasonable officer that the use of force adequate to tear a
tendon is unreasonable against a fully restrained arrestee."4 7 Building upon Pierce,
Casey, and Fogarty, the district courts within the Tenth Circuit began applying
the sliding scale method to various federal civil rights claims.4 ' Additionally, the

4 Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 E3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cit. 2004).
Id. at 1298-1300 (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 E3d 905, 923 (10th Cit. 2001)).
Id. at 1298 (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 E3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
"constitutional provision may be so clear and the conduct so bad that case law is not needed to
establish that this conduct cannot be lawful."); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 E2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir.
1991) ("It is only by ignoring the particularized allegations of deplorable violence and humiliation
advanced by plaintiffs that defendants are able to argue for qualified immunity.").
4

42

" Casey, 509 E3d at 1284.
4

Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 E3d 1147, 1161 (10th Cir. 2008).

" See id. at 1161-62.
46

See id. at 1161.

4

Id. at 1162.

4

See, e.g., Davis v. City of Aurora, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1256-57 (D. Colo. 2010);

Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, No. 1:08-CV-32-TC-BCW, 2009 WL 4981591, at *3-4 (D.
Utah. Dec. 14, 2009), aff'd, 625 E3d 661 (10th Cir. 2010); Asten v. City of Boulder, 652 E
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Tenth Circuit itself later applied the sliding scale in 2010 in Shroffv. Spellman,
affirming a district court's ruling that the defendant police officer arrested the
plaintiff without probable cause."

IM HOPE BEGINS

TO

FADE:

THE SUPREME COURT STRENGTHENS

THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE

Beginning in the early twenty-first century, the Supreme Court began to
strengthen the qualified immunity doctrine in a number of ways, starting with
its 2004 opinion in Brosseau v. Haugen.5 ' In Brosseau, the defendant police officer
shot plaintiff Haugen in the back as he attempted to flee from law enforcement
authorities in his vehicle.5 ' The Ninth Circuit found that the officer had violated
the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to freedom from excessive force, and that
the officer violated a clearly established right such that the officer was not entitled
to qualified immunity.5 2 The Supreme Court granted review only on the "clearly
established" question, and reversed.5 3 While acknowledging its prior ruling in
Hope that, in an obvious case, general statements regarding constitutional rights
can clearly establish the law "even without a body of relevant case law," the
Supreme Court found that Brosseau was "far from [an] obvious" case such that the
Court needed to determine whether the plaintiff's claimed Fourth Amendment
right was clearly established in a more "particularized" sense. 4 Between the two of
them, the plaintiff and the defendant cited only three relevant circuit opinions to

Supp. 2d 1188, 1205 (D. Colo. 2009) ("[U]nder the Tenth Circuit's 'sliding scale' regarding clearly
established law, although identical facts cannot be found in the case law, general constitutional
doctrine combined with the nature of the facts-the unforewarned tasing of a mentally unstable
woman in her own home-lead the Court to conclude that the law at issue was clearly established
at the time Officer Frenzen used his taser to seize Ms. Asten."); Cordova v. Aragon, 560 E Supp. 2d
1041, 1061-62 (D. Colo. 2008) (finding that neither of the two cases cited by plaintiff illustrated
that defendants violated clearly established law in an excessive force case), aff'd, 569 E3d 1181
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1152 (2010).
' Shroff v. Spellman, 604 F3d 1179, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010).
o Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004).
Id. at 194.
52 Id. at 195 (citing Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 E3d 857 (9th Cir. 2003)).

53 See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 195.
" Id. at 199 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); then citing Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). In Brosseau, the general statements of law regarding the Fourth Amendment
came from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), two
prior Supreme Court cases involving excessive force claims. However, in Brosseau and in subsequent
cases, the Supreme Court clarified that Grahamand Garnercannot suffice as clearly established law
outside of an "obvious" case. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199; see also White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552
(2017); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (emphasizing that Graham and Garner"are
Icast at a high level of generality."').
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the Supreme Court, none of which the Court found to govern the case before it.5 5
While Brosseau did not explicitly overrule Hope, it also did not apply Hope's "fair
warning" standard.56 Instead, the Court looked to its previous equation of "clarity"
with "factual similarity" as set forth in Anderson v. Creighton in 1987.51 "Indeed,
Brosseau is an especially potent illustration of the way the stricter Anderson inquiry
favors defendants." 5 8
Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court has further expanded
the qualified immunity defense. Traditionally, in assessing qualified immunity,
courts first needed to determine whether the defendant's actions violated a
constitutional right, and then determine whether or not that right was clearly
established at the time of the action.59 However, in 2009, the Supreme Court
ruled that courts retain discretion to consider those two separate questions in
the order they see fit, such that courts can now conserve judicial resources by
moving directly to the question of whether a right is clearly established. 60 Two
years later, in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the Court reformulated the qualified immunity
standard to require "every 'reasonable official'. . . [to understand] that what he is
doing violates that right." 1 Under Ashcroft, the correct inquiry is now "whether
the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established." 62 To support a
clearly established constitutional right, "existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."6 3 Ashcroft thus raised the bar

* Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 200-01 (first citing Cole v. Bone, 993 E2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993);
then citing Smith v. Freland, 954 E2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992); and then citing Estate of Starks v.
Enyart, 5 E3d 230 (7th Cit. 1993)).
56

Brosseau, 543 U.S at 199.

* John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1308-09
(2012); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
5

Williams, supra note 57, at 1309.

5 See, e.g., Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01 ("A court required to rule upon the qualified
immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to
the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right? This must be the initial inquiry." (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).
' Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); see also, e.g., Kerns v. Bader, 663 E3d 1173,
1181 (10th Cir. 2011); Weise v. Casper, 593 E3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[S]kipping the
constitutional violation question may conserve judicial resources in 'cases in which it is plain that
a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a
right."' (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237)).

6 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
62 Id. at 742 (emphasis added) (first citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02; then citing Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)).
63 Id. at 741 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305,
308 (2015); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 10-11 (2013) ("[W]hether or not the constitutional rule
applied by the court below was correct, it was not 'beyond debate."').
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for overcoming qualified immunity. Indeed, the Supreme Court's subsequent,
repeated, and often unanimous awards of qualified immunity emphasize the
narrow circumstances in which courts may hold government officials personally
liable for their actions in suits for money damages."
In 2015, the Supreme Court issued another seminal qualified immunity
opinion, Mullenix v. Luna, in which the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and
ruled that the defendant state trooper was entitled to qualified immunity for the
shooting death of a criminal suspect.65 The Supreme Court found, inter alia,
that the trooper confronted a fleeing fugitive who had twice threatened to shoot
police officers and who was moments away from encountering another officer
on the roadway. 66 The Supreme Court also found that the cases cited in the
Fifth Circuit's opinion were "simply too factually distinct to speak clearly to the
specific circumstances here."6 7 Notably, the majority opinion in Mullenix did not
cite Hope which, as noted above, was the foundational case for the Tenth Circuit's
adoption of the sliding scale.6' Because qualified immunity protects actions in
the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force, and because existing
precedent did not place the conclusion that the trooper acted unreasonably
"beyond debate," the Court found that the trooper was entitled to qualified
immunity.6 Following Mullenix, the Supreme Court refrained from "any reference
to the plaintiff's countervailing interests in vindicating constitutional rights and
compensation for constitutional injury, which the Supreme Court recognized in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald."7 0

" See, e.g., Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 474 (2012) ("No decision of this Court has found
a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even roughly comparable to those present in this case. On
the contrary, some of our opinions may be read as pointing in the opposition direction."); see also
id. at 477 ("[R]easonable police officers in petitioners' position could have come to the conclusion
that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the Huff residence if there was an objectively
reasonable basis for fearing that violence was imminent."); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044
(2015); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16-20 (2014) (per curiam); Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228,
246 (2014); Plumhoffv. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779-81 (2014); Stanton, 571 U.S. at 10-11;

Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 763-64 (2014).
65 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312 (2015); Luna v. Mullenix, 773 E3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014), rev'd

per curiam, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015).
' See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312.
67

Id'.

' See Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 E3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007); see also
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 306-12.
69 Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312 (quotations and citations omitted).

7 Valdez v. Roybal, 186 E Supp. 3d 1197, 1273 (D.N.M. 2016) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982)).
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The Lower Courts'Reactions to the Supreme Court's Treatment of
QualfiedImmunity

To find the existence of a clearly established right, a federal court must now
"conclude that the firmly settled state of the law, established by a forceful body of
persuasive precedent, would place a reasonable official on notice that his actions
obviously violated a clearly established constitutional right."7 Put another way,
the court must enunciate "a concrete, particularized description of the right." 72
Various federal circuits have recognized that the case law now requires them to be
much more precise in their definition of clearly established rights.7 1 "After laying
out the factual circumstances [of a case] in a sufficiently specific fashion, the
court must determine whether the official's conduct violated a clearly established
rule."7 ' To make this determination, the court must consider "either if courts
have previously ruled that materially similar conduct was unconstitutional, or if
a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law applies with
obvious clarity to the specific conduct at issue."75

B. The Tenth Circuit's Resistance to the Strengthening of QualifiedImmunity
In spite of the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence beginning with Ashcroft
and continuing with Mullenix, the Tenth Circuit continued to apply its sliding
scale analysis in several cases, often using the scale to deny defendants qualified
immunity. First, in Estate ofBooker v. Gomez, the court applied the sliding scale
in a combination Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments case. 76 The case stemmed
from an incident where the plaintiffs' decedent died while in custody after

Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 E3d 633, 639 (3d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
72 Hagans v. Franklin Sheriff's Office, 695 F3d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Spady, 800

71

E3d at 638 (finding that the right at issue must be framed "in a more particularized, and hence more
relevant, sense, in light of the case's specific context . . . ." (citations omitted)); Cordova v. Aragon,
569 F3d 1183, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that, while a general principle regarding the use of
deadly force against a fleeing felon was correct, "it still beg[ged] the question of what constitute[d]
a sufficient threat" for purposes of the case pending before the court).
7 See, e.g., Estate of Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, 810 E3d 892, 907-08 (4th Cit.
2016) ("The constitutional right in question in the present case, defined with regard for Appellees'
particular violative conduct, is Armstrong's right not to be subjected to tasing while offering
stationary and non-violent resistance to a lawful seizure."); Hagans, 695 E3d at 509 ("Defined at the
appropriate level of generality-a reasonably particularized one-the question at hand is whether it
was clearly established in May 2007 that using a taser repeatedly on a suspect actively resisting arrest
and refusing to be handcuffed amounted to excessive force.").
7 Contreras v. Dofia Ana Cry. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 18-156 GBW/GJF, 2018 WL 5832152,
at *8 (D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2018).
7 Estate of Reat v. Rodriguez, 824 E3d 960, 964-65 (10th Cit. 2016) (quotation and
citation omitted); see also Bishop v. Szuba, 739 E App'x 941, 945 (10th Cit. 2018) (formulation of
the right cannot "fail[] to discuss the 'particularized' facts of th[e] case . . . ." (citation omitted)).
76 Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 E3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014).
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officers pinned him face-down to the ground, placed him in a chokehold, and
tased him.n In response to the defendants' assertion that plaintiffs could not
"rely on Fourth Amendment case law to show that any violation of Mr. Booker's
constitutional rights was clearly established," the court found that, under the
sliding scale approach, "Fourth Amendment case law addressing whether force
is 'reasonable' is relevant to the first due process excessive force factor: the
relationship between the amount of force used and the need presented." 8 The
Tenth Circuit also relied upon a Sixth Circuit case which rejected the argument
"that excessive force law was not clearly established because it was unclear whether
the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applied." 7 9 Ultimately, the court ruled,
"despite any uncertainty about which constitutional amendment govern[ed] the
Plaintiffs' excessive force claim, the 'legal norms' underlying the three-factor due
process analysis-proportionality, injury, and motive-were clearly established at
the time of Mr. Booker's death."8 0 The Tenth Circuit found that two of its prior
cases regarding the use of tasers and pressure on the back, as well as "the weight of
authority from other jurisdictions" regarding neck restraint, "put Defendants on
notice that use of such force on a person who is not resisting and who is restrained
in handcuffs is disproportionate."" In Estate ofBooker, the Tenth Circuit-using
its sliding scale analysis-freely intermixed cases arising under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to deny the defendants qualified immunity.82
In Browder v. City ofAlbuquerque, the Tenth Circuit again denied qualified
immunity, relying on its sliding scale to determine that a city police officer
violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights when, while not on official
business, he sped through a red light and caused a terrible crash." In Browder,
then Tenth Circuit Judge, and now United States Supreme Court Justice, Neil
Gorsuch noted that "some things are so obviously unlawful that they don't require
detailed explanation and sometimes the most obviously unlawful things happen
so rarely that a case on point is itself an unusual thing."8 4 While noting that the
court had not faced many cases involving deadly traffic accidents with officers
speeding on their own business, Judge Gorsuch found that both the Supreme

n Id. at 409.
Id. at 427-28 (citing id. at 424 n.26).
79 Id. (citing Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 E3d 356, 367 (6th Cit. 2009)).
78

8
81
82

Estate ofBooker, 745 E3d at 428.

Id. at 428-29 (citations and footnote omitted).
See id. at 424-28.

13

Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 E3d 1076, 1082-83 (10th Cit. 2015).

8

Id. at 1082.
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Court and the Tenth Circuit had "spoken unmistakably to this situation" such
that qualified immunity was inappropriate. 5
Additionally, in Davis v. Cliford," the Tenth Circuit reversed a grant of
qualified immunity to two police officers, finding that, " [i]f proven, their alleged
use of force against a misdemeanant who did not pose an immediate threat to
herself or others would be excessive under clearly established law." 7 While the
court again acknowledged Casey's adoption of the sliding scale, it also recognized
the Supreme Court's admonishment against defining clearly established law at a
high level of generality." Nonetheless, the panel in Davis opined that it "need not
have decided a case involving similar facts to say that no reasonable officer could
believe that he was entitled to behave as [the defendant officers] allegedly did.""
The panel found that, "[w]hen an officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment is
particularly clear .

.

. we do not require a second decision with greater specificity

'

to clearly establish the law." 90 The court also ruled that "a reasonable officer would
know based on his training that the force used was not justified." 9
By contrast, in A.M. v. Holmes, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that a school
resource officer violated her minor son's "clearly established Fourth Amendment
right to be free from an excessively forceful arrest" when the officer handcuffed
the boy before driving him to a detention center.92 The officer arrested the boy for
interfering with the educational process in violation of state law after observing
the boy disrupt his class by making fake burping noises and otherwise engaging

" Id. at 1083 (first citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 883, 854 n.13 (1998)
(noting expressly that even when a court finds that an officer did not violate the Constitution, when
a private person suffers a serious physical injury due to a police officer's intentional misuse of his
vehicle, a viable due process claim can arise); and then citing Checki v. Webb, 785 E2d 534, 538
(5th Cir.1986)); see also Browder, 787 E3d at 1083 (warning "that an officer who kills a person while
speeding at 60 miles an hour on surface streets absent any emergency and in violation of state law
invites a Fourteenth Amendment claim." (citing Williams v. City & County of Denver, 99 F.3d
1009 (10th Cit. 1996), vacated, 140 F3d 855 (10th Cir. 1997)).
86

Davis v. Clifford, 825 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2016).

* Id. at 1133.
" Id. at 1136 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)).
' Id at 1136 (quoting Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2007)).
9o Id at 1136 (quoting Morris v. Noe, 672 E3d 1185, 1197 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted)).
9' See Davis, 825 E3d at 1137; see also id. at 1135-36 (applying the factors from Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), regarding whether a particular use of force is excessive for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, "including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect]
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at
396)); Davis, 825 E3d at 1137 (citing Morris, 672 F.3d at 1198); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
741 (2002)).
2

A.M. v. Holmes, 830 E3d 1123, 1150-51 (10th Cit. 2016).
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in "horseplay." 9 3 The plaintiff pointed to Graham as binding precedent clearly
establishing the relevant constitutional right, arguing that there was no need to
94
handcuff and transport her son after his arrest. However, the Tenth Circuit
found that "Graham, though certainly an excessive-force lodestar, provides no
guidance concerning whether an officer, when effecting an arrest supported
by probable cause, must refrain from using handcuffs because the arrestee is a
minor." 95 The court further noted that, under its sliding scale approach, it would
"not gainsay that, under certain circumstances where the excessive force is of a
particularly egregious nature (e.g., an incredibly reckless taking of a human life
by a law-enforcement officer), Graham or little more may qualify as the clearly
96
established law that defeats a qualified-immunity defense." The court ultimately
held "[i] t would border on the fatuous" for the plaintiff to suggest that the officer's
handcuffing of her son "constitutes one of those rare instances of egregious
conduct where Graham, alone, would be a sufficient source of clearly established
law." 9 7 Thus, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument for overcoming qualified
immunity, finding that the facts of the case were not egregious enough to relieve
the plaintiff of the burden of finding specific cases that clearly established the
constitutional right.
Similarly, in Estate of Lockett v. Fallin, the Tenth Circuit again contrasted
its sliding scale approach with the precept that courts should not define clearly
established law at a high level of generality." In that case, the estate of a death
row inmate claimed that the inmate's prolonged execution constituted torture,
9
violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff estate generally alleged
that defendants violated the inmate's "clearly established right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment."'oo However, the court found that the estate
did "not account for how cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims operate in the
execution context."'o The court reasoned that, "because capital punishment is
constitutional, lawful means must exist to carry it out," and that "[s]ome risk of
pain is inherent in any method of execution-no matter how humane-if only

93

See id. at 1141.

9 See id. at 1152.
9

Id. (citations omitted).

" Id. at 1153 n.17 (citing Pauly v. White, 814 E3d 1060, 1075 (10th Cir. 2016) ("Thus,
when an officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment is particularly clear from Graham itself, we
do not require a second decision with greater specificity to clearly establish the law." (quotation and
citations omitted)).
" A.M., 830 F.3d at 1153 n.17.
98 Estate of Lockett v. Fallin, 841 E3d 1098, 1107 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).
9 See generally id. at 1105-06.
1..

01

Id. at 1109.
Id.
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from the prospect of error in following the required procedure."1 0 2 The court
recognized that the inmate suffered during his execution; however, "that alone
does not make out an Eighth Amendment claim."'>0 3 While acknowledging that
cases almost never have exactly the same circumstances such that the sliding
scale required less specificity as conduct becomes more obviously egregious, in
Lockett, the court was unable to find Eighth Amendment cases announcing clearly
established law applicable to the facts of that case.' The Tenth Circuit similarly
tempered its application of the sliding scale in several unpublished opinions
from 2013 to 2016, further signifying the court's declining use of the scale in its
qualified immunity cases. 1

V. THE

BEGINNING OF THE END

FOR THE SLIDING SCALE: ALDABA

v.

PIcKENs

In Aldaba v. Pickens, a panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of
summary judgment to the defendant officers, who used a stun gun to detain
the plaintiffs decedent. 0 6 The court reviewed several previous cases in which
the Tenth Circuit explored "the reasonableness of taser use in general without
discussing the specific ramifications of law enforcement's use of tasers against the
mentally and physically ill." 10 7 The split Tenth Circuit panel found-applying the
sliding scale-"that it is not objectively reasonable to employ a taser as the initial
use of force against a seriously ill, non-criminal subject who poses a threat only to
himself and is showing only passive resistance, regardless of whether they provide
a warning first.""08

102

Id. (internal

103

Id. at 1110.

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)).

Id. at 1113.
See Wilson v. City of Lafayette, 510 F. App'x 775, 777 (10th Cir. 2013) ("[I]n
all events,
however, it remains necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that 'every reasonable official would
have understood that what he did violated the law." (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)))); Waters v. Coleman,
632 E App'x 431, 435 (10th Cit. 2015) ("'[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.' . . . If the facts place the case in
the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,' the law is not clearly established." (quoting
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ornelas v. Lovewell,
613 F. App'x 718, 721-22 (10th Cir. 2015) ("[E]ven assuming Trooper Lovewell's kick amounted
to a use of excessive force . . . Ornelas would ... have to provide a case with a substantially similar
set of facts to prevail." (citing Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 E3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cit.
2007))). But see Cook v. Peters, 604 F. App'x 663 (10th Cir. 2015) (denying qualified immunity in
"forceful takedown" case).
16 SeegenerallyAldaba v. Pickens, 777 E3d 1148,
1152-53 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S.
10

105

Ct. 479 (2015).
117 Id
at 1159-60.
108

See generally id. at 1159-61.
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Later that year, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment
09
and remanded for further deliberation in light of Mullenix.' On remand from
the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit noted in Aldaba II that, in Mullenix, the
Supreme Court declined to follow "the Fifth Circuit's analysis applying Trooper
Mullenix's acts against a general legal rule-that is, a police officer may not use
deadly force against a fleeing felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm
110
to the officer or others-to meet the requirement of clearly established law."
The Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court "looked to see if any case would
make it clear to every reasonable official that Trooper Mullenix's actions would
amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment" but was unable
to find a case that did so."' In light of Mullenix, the Tenth Circuit applied the
facts against existing precedent to see whether every reasonable official would have
2
known that those facts would establish excessive force "beyond debate."" The
court found that it had erred in its prior opinion "by relying on excessive-force
3
cases markedly different from this one."" In its prior opinion, the Tenth Circuit
panel relied on its "sliding-scale approach measuring degrees of egregiousness in
affirming the denial of qualified immunity" and "relied on several cases resolving
excessive-force claims.""' However, "none of those cases remotely involved a
situation" as that which was presented in the A//aba case: "three law-enforcement
officers responding to a distress call from medical providers seeking help in
controlling a disruptive, disoriented medical patient so they could provide him
5
life-saving medical treatment.""' Therefore, the court began to recognize that
it could not rely on prior cases with merely somewhat analogous facts in setting
forth "clearly established" law.
Indeed, in Aldaba II, the Tenth Circuit noted that its sliding scale approach
may have fallen out of favor, because the sliding-scale test relied, in part, on Hope,
and the Supreme Court's most recent qualified immunity decision at that time
(Mullenix) did not invoke Hope."'6 The Tenth Circuit explained:

o' Pickens v. Aldaba, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); see also Middaugh v. City ofThree Rivers, 629 E
App'x 710 (6th Cir. 2015) (affirming denial of qualified immunity to police officers in due process/
wrongful seizure case), vacated and remanded, Piper v. Middaugh, 136 S. Ct. 2408 (2016), on
remand, Middaugh v. City of Three Rivers, 684 E App'x 522 (6th Cir. 2017) (reversing denial of
qualified immunity).
'o Aldabav. Pickens (AldabaI), 844 F.3d 870, 873-74 (10th Cit. 2016) (quotations omitted).
". See id. at 874 (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310 (2015)).
112 Id. at 874. (citing Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 312).
113

Id. at 876.

"
115

Id.
Id.

116

See id. at 874 n.
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To show clearly established law, the Hope Court did not
require earlier cases with "fundamentally similar" facts, noting
that "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances." . . . This

calls to mind our sliding-scale approach measuring the egregiousness of conduct .

. .

. But the Supreme Court has vacated our

opinion here and remanded for us to reconsider our opinion in
view of Mullenix, which reversed the Fifth Circuit after finding
that the cases it relied on were "simply too factually distinct to
speak clearly to the specific circumstances here." . . . We also

note that the majority opinion in Mullenix does not cite Hope v.
Pelzer .

.

.. As can happen over time, the Supreme Court might

be emphasizing different portions of its earlier decisions.'

17

Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that "[a] clearly established right is one
that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
what he is doing violates that right." 1 8 While positing that plaintiffs could still
"overcome a qualified-immunity defense without a favorable case directly on
point, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
beyond debate."" 9 Thus, the Tenth Circuit began to appreciate how the Supreme
Court had buttressed the qualified immunity defense, and began to question
whether the sliding scale still had a place in qualified immunity jurisprudence.

VI.

ALONG

CAME PAULY

In its 2016 decision in Pauly v. White, a divided panel of the Tenth Circuit
upheld the denial of qualified immunity to three state police officers after one of
the officers shot and killed the plaintiffs' decedent while investigating a road rage
incident in October of 2011.120 The shooting officer arrived at the decedent's
house after the other two officers, who had been attempting to coax the decedent
and his brother (the road rage suspect) out of the house, allegedly shouted "we're
coming in."' 2 ' The brothers armed themselves; one of them shouted, "we have
guns" and proceeded to fire two warning shots near the back of the house.1 22

"' Id. at 874 n. 1 (citations omitted); see also McGarry v. Bd. Comm'rs, 294 E Supp. 3d 1170,
1187-88 (D.N.M. 2018).
"' Aldaba II, 844 E3d at 877 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"9 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
120 Paulyv. White (PaulyI),814 E3d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir.), reh'gdenied,
817 E3d 715 (10th
Cir. 2016), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).
121

See generally id. at 1066.

122

Id. at 1066-67.
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The plaintiffs' decedent then pointed a handgun in the direction of the shooting
officer, White.' 2 3 Believing that the decedent shot one of his fellow officers, and
24
seeing the gun pointed in his direction, White shot the decedent.1 In denying
the officer's qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment excessive
force claim under the sliding scale approach, the court looked to its prior decision
in Casey, finding that "[a]ny objectively reasonable officer in [White's] position
would well know that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against
intruders and that the officer has no right to immediately use deadly force in
125
these circumstances."
Nearly a year later, in White v. Pauly, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the Tenth Circuit panel majority, finding that Officer White was
entitled to qualified immunity because he "did not violate clearly established law"
26
when he shot and killed the plaintiffs' decedent. 1In so ruling, the Supreme
Court noted that this was not a case where it was obvious that there was a
violation of clearly established law, under the unique set of facts and circumstances
27
presented, "in light of White's late arrival on the scene."1 The Court also found
that there was no Fourth Amendment principle which mandated an officer in
White's position "to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her
28
fellow officers in instances like the one White confronted here."' The Supreme
Court-with palpable frustration-reiterated "the longstanding principle that
29
clearly established law should not be defined at a high level of generality."
Instead, "the clearly established law must be 'particularized' to the facts of
the case."'3 0
The Supreme Court ultimately vacated and remanded the divided Tenth
Circuit panel's decision, faulting the panel for failing to identify a case where an
officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth
Amendment, and for relying on Graham and Garner (and their Court of Appeals
progeny) which "lay out excessive-force principles at only a general level."'31
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that "general statements of the law are

123

Id. at 1067.

124

See id at 1066-67. "The entire incident took less than five minutes." Id. at 1067.

125

Id. at 1084.

126

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam).

127

See id. at 552.

128

Id.

129

White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see
also Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1298 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, I.B. v. Woodard, 139 S.
Ct. 2616 (2019); if Pyle v. Woods, 874 F3d 1257, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2017).
130

''

See White, 137 S. Ct. at 550-52.
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not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning[,]" it also reemphasized
that "Garner and Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law
outside 'an obvious case."' 1 32 Otherwise, "[p]laintiffs would be able to convert
the rule of qualified immunity .

.

. into a rule of virtually unqualified liability

simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights."' 3 In the three years
since it decided White v. Pauly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this
"particularity" or "specificity" requirement in qualified immunity cases.1 34 In that
same period, the federal circuits have consistently applied the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence in the same manner. 3 1

VII.

THE SLow

DEATH

OF THE SLIDING SCALE AFTER ALDABA AND PAULY

Because the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit twice in recent
years, the circuit began openly questioning its sliding scale approach in its 2017

132 Id. at 552 (first quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997); then quoting
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).

White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639).
See City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019), on remand, 921 E3d 1172
(9th Cir. 2019) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity); District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) ("[T]he clearly established standard ... requires a
high degree of specificity" (quotations omitted)); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018)
(per curiam) ("[P]olice officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent 'squarely
governs' the specific facts at issue." (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015))); Ziglar
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866-67 (2017); see also McKnight v. Petersen, 137 S. Ct. 2241 (2017)
(vacating and remanding for further consideration in light of White v. Pauly), on remand, Petersen v.
Lewis Cty., 697 F. App'x 490, 491 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that, even if the defendant officer had
acted unreasonably, the plaintiff "failed to identify any clearly established law putting [defendant]
on notice that, under these facts, his conduct was unlawful." (citation omitted)).
1

134

3 See, e.g., Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 E3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Howard, 679
E App'x 177, 181-82, 182 n.9 (3rd Cit. 2017); E.W v. Dolgos, 884 E3d 172, 185-87 (4th Cit.
2018) (finding that even where school resource officer "used unreasonable force disproportionate
to the circumstances presented . . . amount[ing] to excessive force," plaintiff's "right not to be
handcuffed under the circumstances of this case was not clearly established at the time of her
seizure"); Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 E3d 384, 394 (5th Cit. 2017) (assuming "that the
specific White/Mullenix admonition applies to all qualified immunity cases regardless of the constitutional violation charged"); Melton v. Phillips, 875 E3d 256, 265 n.9, 265-66 (5th Cit. 2017)
(en banc), certdenied, 138 S. Ct. 1550 (2018); Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 E3d
988, 992-94 (6th Cir. 2017); Kemp v. Liebel, 877 E3d 346, 351-53 (7th Cir. 2017); Estate of
Walker v. Wallace, 881 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (8th Cit. 2018); Thompson v. Rahr, 885 E3d 582,
587 (9th Cit. 2018) (finding that although police officer's use of excessive force violated plaintiffs
constitutional rights, officer was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff's right not to have
a gun pointed at him under the circumstances was not clearly established at the time the events took
place), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 381 (2018); S.B. v. City of San Diego, 864 E3d 1010, 1015-16 (9th
Cir. 2017); Knopf v. Williams, 884 E3d 939, 946-50 (10th Cit. 2018); Redmond v. Crowther, 882
E3d 927, 935, 938-39 (10th Cit. 2018); McCoy v. Meyers, 887 E3d 1034, 1043, 1053 (10th Cit.
2018); Gates v. Khokhar, 884 E3d 1290, 1302- 03 (11th Cir. 2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 807
(2019); see also Lindsey v. Hyler, 918 E3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cit. 2019).
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opinion in Sause v. Bauer.'3 6 In Sause, the plaintiff alleged that two police officers
visited her apartment in response to a noise complaint, gained admittance to
her apartment, and then proceeded to engage in a course of strange and abusive
conduct-in particular, laughing at the plaintiff, mocking her, and telling her
that she could not pray-before citing her for disorderly conduct and interfering
with law enforcement.1 37 On the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity, the
Tenth Circuit framed the relevant "clearly established law" inquiry as involving:
a scenario in which (1) officers involved in a legitimate investigation obtain consent to enter a private residence and (2) while
there, ultimately cite an individual for violating the law but (3) in
the interim, interrupt their investigation to order the individual
to stop engaging in religiously-motivated conduct so that they
can (4) briefly harass her before (5) issuing a citation.1 38
The Tenth Circuit noted it had recently called into question the sliding-scale
approach it first identified in Casey.13 1 While questioning whether the slidingscale method even survived the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mullenix, the
Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the sliding scale would not aid the plaintiff in
overcoming the qualified immunity defense.'
One month after deciding Sause, the Tenth Circuit handed down its decision
in Lowe v. Raemisch, in which the court continued to scrutinize the sliding-scale
approach.' 4 ' In that case, a state prisoner sued two senior prison officials under
Section 1983, alleging that he was deprived of outdoor exercise for two years

Sause v. Bauer, 859 E3d 1270, 1276 (10th Cit. 2017), rev'd on other grounds, 138 S. Ct.
2561 (2018), on remand, 733 F App'x 456 (10th Cir. 2018).
136

'3

See generally Sause, 859 F.3d at 1273.

138

Id. at 1275.

139

Id

at 1276 n.3 (citing Aldaba v. Pickens (Aldaba II), 844 E3d 870, 874 n.1 (10th

Cir. 2016)).
14 Id. at 1276 n.3 (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015)). As noted above, the
Supreme Court reversed the grant of qualified immunity in the officers' favor, noting that it was
"unclear whether the police officers were in petitioner's apartment at the time in question based
on her consent, whether they had some other ground consistent with the Fourth Amendment for
entering and remaining there, or whether their entry or continued presence was unlawful," and that
plaintiff did not "state what, if anything, the officers wanted her to do at the time when she was
allegedly told to stop praying. Without knowing the answers to these questions, it [was] impossible
to analyze petitioner's free exercise claim." See Sause, 138 S. Ct. at 2563. However, the Court "did
not take issue with the Tenth Circuit's formulation as it related to the First Amendment claim.
Instead, the Court reversed the grant of qualified immunity because the Tenth Circuit failed to
address the Fourth Amendment claim inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs First Amendment
claim." Contreras v. Dofia Ana Bd. ofComm'rs, No. 18-156 GBW/GJF, 2018 WL 5832152, at *7
n.5 (D.N.M. Nov. 7, 2018); see also Sause, 138 S. Ct. at 2562-63.
141

Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205 (10th Cit. 2017), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 5 (2018).
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and one month in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. 4 2 On appeal of the district court's denial of the
defendants' motions to dismiss, the Tenth Circuit assumed the officials violated
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, but nevertheless found that the denial of
outdoor exercise for two years and one month did not violate a clearly established
constitutional right. 43 The court found that the deprivation of outdoor exercise
for two years and one month was not so obviously unlawful that a constitutional
4
violation would be "undebatable."' While acknowledging that, "[e]ven in the
absence of egregious conduct, [a] constitutional violation may be so obvious
that similar conduct seldom arises in [its] cases," the Tenth Circuit ultimately
"consider[ed] whether [its own] precedents render[ed] the legality of the conduct
undebatable."'4 The court then posited that its "sliding-scale approach may
arguably conflict with recent Supreme Court precedent on qualified immunity."146
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "[t] he possibility of a conflict arises because
the sliding-scale approach may allow [the court] to find a clearly established
7
right even when a precedent is neither on point nor obviously applicable."'
However, the Tenth Circuit declined to decide whether its sliding-scale approach
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, given that "the defendants lacked clearly
applicable precedents showing whether denial of outdoor exercise for two years
and one month was sufficiently serious to constitute a violation of plaintiff's
48
clearly established Eighth Amendment rights."1
Nearly ten months after the Supreme Court reversed the denial of qualified
immunity in White v. Pauly, on remand the Tenth Circuit itself reversed the denial
9
of qualified immunity to all three of the defendant officers in Pauly II' The
two-judge panel majority spent much of the opinion analyzing whether or not the
0
allegedly reckless actions of the officers precipitated the need to use deadly force.'1
Nonetheless, the three panel members unanimously found that the defendant
5
officers were entitled to qualified immunity.' ' The court noted that, in its prior

142

See id. at 1206-07.

11

Id. at 1207.

114

Id. at 1210 (emphasis omitted).

145 Id. at 1210-11 (first citing Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,
377-78 (2009); then citing Aldaba v. Pickens (Aldaba II), 844 E3d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 2016)).
146 Id. at 1211 n.10 (citing Aldaba H, 844 E3d at 874 n.1).
Lowe, 864 F.3d at 1211 n.10 (first citing Aldaba II, 844 E3d at 874 n.1; then citing
Mascorro v. Billings, 656 E3d 1198, 1208 n.13 (10th Cit. 2011) (declining to apply the standards
of Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) to a situation where the constitutional violation was not
obvious)); see also Knopf v. Williams, 884 E 3d 939, 950 n.10 (10th Cir. 2018).
W

"W

See Lowe, 864 E3d at 1211 n.10.

"4

See generally Pauly v. White (Pauly II), 874 F.3d 1197 (10th Cit. 2017).

50

See generally id. at 1203-06, 1211-22.

'5' See id. at 1222-23.
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opinion, the panel majority relied on the Casey sliding-scale test in affirming the
denial of qualified immunity to the three individual defendants. 152 However,
following remand, the unanimous panel found that (1) there was no case "close
enough on point to make the unlawfulness of [Officer White's] actions apparent";
(2) Officer White's "alleged use of excessive force was not clearly established in the
circumstances of this case" and "therefore cannot serve as the basis of liability for"
any of the officers; and (3) neither of the other officers "committed a constitutional
violation in his own right."' 53
Later, in McCoy v. Meyers, the plaintiff claimed that officers utilized excessive
force when they struck him repeatedly after he was handcuffed and zip-tied.5 4
Even while denying qualified immunity on the plaintiff's claim regarding postrestraint force, the court expressly declined to rely on the sliding scale, and thus,
declined to decide its validity. 55 Instead, the court posited that nothing in recent
Supreme Court precedent had undercut the merits holding in Casey which, along
with other Tenth Circuit cases, "should have put the [defendants] on notice that
the post-restraint force was excessive."' 56 In this same period, the court, without
specifically mentioning the sliding scale, reversed denials of summary judgment
in a pair of excessive force cases where the district courts relied upon the sliding
scale. 1 7 Nonetheless, in late 2018 the Tenth Circuit assumed, without deciding,
that the sliding scale applied in Nosewicz v. Janosko, where the court reversed the
grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive force claim.158 However,
the Tenth Circuit found that, even if the sliding scale did not apply, the case
warranted reversal because the district court's case law analysis turned on the
plaintiff's alleged "active resistance," which the parties disputed as a matter of
fact.159 This decision further clouded the Tenth Circuit's approach to whether,
and in what circumstances, it would continue to apply the sliding scale. While the
court openly questioned the scale in its published, precedential opinions in 2018,
the court's later (albeit unpublished) 2018 case on the subject was ambiguous
about whether or not the court should continue to apply the scale.

152

15

Id. at 1208-09 (quoting Pauly 1, 814 E3d 1060, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 2016)).
Pauly II, 874 E3d at 1223 (citations omitted).

"5 See McCoy v. Meyers, 887 E3d 1034, 1042 (10th Cir. 2018).
151 See id. at 1053 n.22.
56 Id. (first citing Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1991); then citing
Weigel v.
Broad, 544 E3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008)).
'57 See Malone v. Board of Comm'rs, 707 E App'x 552 (10th Cit. 2017) (reversing Malone v.
BoardofComm'rs, No. CIV 15-0876JB/GBW, 2016 WL 5400381 (D.N.M. Aug. 27, 2016); Farrell
v. Montoya, 878 F3d 933 (10th Cir. 2017) (reversing Farrellv. DeTavis, No. 15-cv-1113 SMV/
LAM, 2016 WL 10859789 (D.N.M. Aug. 30, 2016)).
'M Nosewicz v. Janosko, 754 E App'x 725, 733 n.8 (10th Cir. 2018).
159

See id.
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More recently, in Bailey v. Twomey,' 60 the court again briefly acknowledged
the continued existence of the sliding scale, but nonetheless looked to the
16 1
"particularity" standard set forth in more recent qualified immunity case law.
In Bailey, officers were summoned to the plaintiff's house for a domestic
situation. 162 The plaintiff-who was afraid of her then-husband-moved to
stand behind the officers while her husband collected his personal belongings.
While doing so, the plaintiff "brushed or touched" one officer's back; the officer
immediately grabbed the plaintiff's wrist, pulled her around, and hit her very
hard in the chest, knocking her to the floor. 16 The plaintiff claimed that this
constituted excessive force; however, the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiff
failed to point to clearly established law holding that the Fourth Amendment
bars an officer from grabbing an individual's wrist and knocking him or her
down after feeling the individual touch the officer from behind during the course
of overseeing a tense domestic matter.' Bailey thus casts further doubt on the
continued viability of the sliding scale.

VIII.

CONCLUSION: SHOULD THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ABOLISH OR REPLACE THE SLIDING

SCALE?

The central foundation of the Tenth Circuit's sliding scale, Hope's suggestion
that "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even
16
in novel factual circumstances," is increasingly being questioned. ' Whatever
could once be said of the Tenth Circuit's sliding scale approach, its validity in light
of the Supreme Court's decade-long reinforcement of the qualified immunity
defense is tenuous at best.'" While the Tenth Circuit has not officially done away

'6 Bailey v. Twomey, No. 19-8004, 2019 WL 5681312 (10th Cir. Oct. 31, 2019)
6' Bailey, 2019 WL 5681312 at *3 (citing Quinn v. Young, 780 E3d 998, 1014 (10th Cir.
2015) (holding thatTenth Circuit's prior opinion in Morris v. Noe, 672 E3d 1185, 1197 (10th Cit.
2012), did not "relieve [p]laintiffs of their obligation to identify clearly established law by reference
to decisions that at least ha[d] a substantial factual correspondence with" the case at issue).
162 Id. at* 1.
16 See id

'" See id. at *4-5.
165 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see, e.g., N.E.L. v. Douglas, 740 E App'x 920,
928 n.18 (10th Cir. 2018) (noting that the standard set forth in Hope regarding clearly established
law "appears to have fallen out of favor, yielding to a more robust qualified immunity" (first citing
Aldaba I, 844 E3d 870, 874 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016); then citing Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
305, 308, 312 (2015))), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1320 (2019); see also Nelson v. Donovan, No.
18-cv-01159-MEH, 2019 WL 2602515, at *5 (D. Colo. June 25, 2019). Cf Navarro v. New
Mexico Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 2:16-cv-1 180-JMC-CG, 2018 WL 4148452, at *10 n.7 (D.N.M.
Aug. 30, 2018) (declining to address plaintiffs' assertion that Hope v. Pelzer conflicts with Kisela v.
Hughes, and finding that "Kisela clearly compels this Court to grant qualified immunity where no
existing precedent places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.").
'" See supra notes 50 -136 and accompanying text.
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with the sliding scale analysis as of yet, the infrequency with which it has applied
the scale over the past few years might be a sign that the court is quietly putting
the sliding scale method to rest, as it should.' 67
As it finds no support in any United States Supreme Court precedents,
what, if anything, should replace the sliding scale? Instead of a linear scale, the
distribution of qualified immunity cases from across the country over the last
decade yields something closer to an imperfect bell curve, with obvious nonviolations of the constitution (e.g., arresting a suspect with a properly-supported
warrant and/or clear probable cause, or shooting at a suspect who has fired at
the officer or civilians in the area) falling on one side of the curve, while obvious
constitutional violations (e.g., shooting a suspect who has clearly and visibly
surrendered and is unarmed) lie at the other end of the curve.' The vast majority
of cases would lie in the middle of the curve. Of that majority-particularly those
cases arising in the last four to five years-there is no clearly established case law,
nor a robust consensus of cases, particularized to the facts of the case at issue. 9
As cases approach the "obvious constitutional violation" side of the curve, there
should be more on-point Supreme Court or circuit opinions that should put
reasonable officials on notice that their conduct is unlawful such that qualified
immunity might not be appropriate. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's
repeated practice of ensuring that settled law is properly applied to even the most
fact-intensive qualified immunity cases. 7 0

See supra notes 136 -59 and accompanying text.
168 See generally Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 911 (7th
Cir. 2018) (denying qualified
immunity to a police officer who, in the context of an argument and fist fight over parking tickets,
shot a semi-truck driver after the driver stopped fighting, stepped back from the officer, and-with
his hands in the air-twice said 'I surrender.").
167

169 See supra notes 72, 73, 135 and accompanying text.
170

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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